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INTRODUCTION
Memorial Stadium is separated into two discrete sections. The stands are referred to in
this brief as Open-Bleacher Seating. The other section is a screened mixed-use area intended for
eating/drinking/socializing designated as the Hawks Nest/Executive Club. This area is referred
to hereinafter as the Hawks Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose Areal in keeping with the
nomenclature employed in the trend of modem decisions rejecting the so-called "Limited Duty
Rule." These cases recognize that the "Limited Duty Rule" has become outmoded given the
growing prevalence of Multi-Purpose Areas in modem stadiums where owners intentionally
create and subject patrons to profitable diversions from the baseball game itself. See, Fn. 9 at p.
24 and discussion of Edward C. v. City ofAlbuquerque, 148 N.M. 646, 653, 241 P.3d 1086,
1093, (2010) at p. 28, infra. As set forth in detail below, Memorial Stadium's Hawks
Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose Area is completely covered overhead and in front by mesh
safety netting, save for the one gap where Mr. Rountree lost his eye. See, aerial photo of
Memorial Stadium with relevant areas labeled at Appx. 1-2, and higher quality photographs from
the Clerk's Record showing safety netting in the Hawks Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose
Area. The Open-Bleacher Seating Area also has extensive safety netting, though substantial
portions of it are vulnerable to injuries from foul balls. This case does not involve the issue of
the nature of Boise Hawk's duty to spectators in the Open-Bleacher Seating.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Mr. Rountree Did Not Consent To Assuming The Risk Of The Loss Of His Eye

Since Appellant did not raise the factual issue of contractual waiver of appeal, facts

For purposes of orientation, Respondent has included in the Appendix photographs of these areas
(included in the Clerk's Record) with the relevant areas labeled for easy identification. Appx. p. 1-2.
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concerning Mr. Rountree's purchase of tickets and what was printed on those tickets is irrelevant.
Nevertheless, Boise Hawks have loaded their brief with almost 15 pages of facts, most of which
are irrelevant to the consideration of the legal issues raised on appeal. To the extent that Boise
Hawks have included irrelevant facts in their briefing or fax tell only part of the story, Mr.
Rountree is constrained to acquaint the Court with the true facts in the record. Bud Rountree was
a season ticket subscriber for many years before his eye was put out at a Boise Hawks game at
Memorial Stadium. On September 30, 2007 he agreed to renew his season tickets and made a
commitment to renew those tickets for three years. This is the only agreement that he entered
into with any of the Defendants. CR 605 [note: for brevity, leading zeros are not included in
references to the Clerk's Record], Rountree Aff. ,-r22, Exhibit 10. The agreement does not
contain any consent, waiver, release of liability or other such language. CR 605, Rountree Aff.
,-r23. Mr. Rountree received his tickets after he had entered into the agreement to renew his
tickets and after he had paid for the tickets. CR 605, Rountree Aff. ,-r24. No one advised him
prior to purchasing or receiving his tickets that they believed that by accepting the tickets or
attending the baseball games he was consenting to accepting any risk of injury. CR 605,

Rountree Aff. ,-r25. He did not sign or otherwise enter into any other agreement with the
Defendants containing any consent, waiver, release of liability or other such language. CR 605,

Rountree Aff. ,-r26. At no time did Mr. Rountree expressly, either in writing or orally, consent to
accepting any risk of injury, to assume any risk or injury, to release anyone from liability for any
injury caused by anyone sustained while he was attending any baseball game in Memorial
Stadium. CR 605, Rountree Aff. ,-r26. At no time did he otherwise intend by conduct to manifest
any such consent to accepting any risk of injury, to assume any risk or injury, to release anyone
from liability for any injury caused by anyone sustained while he was attending any baseball
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game in Memorial Stadium. CR 605, Rountree Aff. ~27. Mr. Rountree is not aware of any
conduct on his part from which anyone could infer that he had manifested consent to accepting
any risk of injury, to assume any risk or injury, or to release anyone from liability for any injury
caused by anyone sustained while he was attending any baseball game in Memorial Stadium. CR

606, Rountree Aff. ~29. Mr. Rountree never read the language on the backs of any ofthe tickets
sent to him by the Defendants. Mr. Rountree did not believe that he was under any obligation to
do so, and the language was in such tiny print that it could not be read without great effort. He
was not advised that he was under any obligation to read anything on the tickets.
Advertisements were printed on the backs of the tickets and for all he knew the printing related
to the advertisements, though he never bothered to find out. The only thing that Mr. Rountree
read on the tickets was the date and the seat number. CR 606, Rountree Aff.~30.

2. Distinguishing Between the Open-Bleacher Seating and the Hawk's Nest/Executive
Club Multi-Purpose Area
Separate from Memorial Stadium's Open-Bleacher Seating Area is a large Multi-Purpose
Area that includes the "Hawks Nest" and the "Executive Club." This area is furnished with
moveable tables, chairs and stools within which patrons can eat, drink, sit and socialize and, if
they wish, and depending upon where in these areas they are seated, watch the baseball game.
The Hawk's Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose Area in effect serves simply as a restaurant for
anyone seated facing away from the game around tables provided by the Defendants. See, CR 6,
88 692,694, 696, Appx. 2. The Hawk's Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose Area is entirely
covered with mesh safety netting overhead, and vertical netting protects patrons from the game
all the way down the left field line to the left field wall, save for the gap at the very end where
Mr. Rountree lost his eye. See, photographs at CR 686, 688, 690, 696, Appx. 2.
On August 13,2008, Bud Rountree, his wife and grandsons attended a baseball game
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conducted in Memorial Stadium by the Boise Hawks. Though spectators can take food and
beverages into the Open-Bleacher Seating, where they would indeed might have to keep their
eye on the game to avoid injury, Mr. Rountree had reserved a table at which to eat in the Hawks
Nest. CR 601, Rountree Aff. ~5, CR 608-611, Exhibits 1 and 2. Both the lower and the elevated
sections ofthe Hawks Nest are protected from pop-fly balls by a continuous barrier of
horizontally strung mesh netting. The Executive Club is connected to the lower section ofthe
Hawks Nest, and the entire area is protected by a horizontally strung protective mesh barrier. CR
600-602, Rountree Aff. ~3, 6, 12; Exhibits 1,2,3,4,6, 7, and 11, CR 608-615,618-621,628629. The continuity of the netting is best illustrated by Exhibit 4. The entire length of the lower
section of the Hawks Nest is protected from line drive foul balls by a vertically strung mesh
netting barrier. CR 603, Rountree Aff. ~13. The entire length of the stadium behind home plate
and down the right field line is also protected by vertically strung mesh netting barrier. CR 603,
Rountree Aff. ~14, Exhibit 9. It appears from the record that every seat and area in which patrons
find themselves is protected by vertically strung protective netting separating the fans from the
game (including Open-Bleacher Seating) with the sole exception of the front section of the
elevated section ofthe Hawks Nest where Mr. Rountree lost his eye. CR 603, Rountree Aff. ~15.
While the bleacher areas of Memorial Stadium have fixed seating and are obviously
designed for but one purpose - watching the baseball game - the dining and drinking areas
variously described as the "Hawks Nest," the "elevated section of the Hawks Nest" and the
"Executive Club" are areas intended, designed and furnished for multiple uses, such as watching
the game while consuming food and beverages and/or socializing with others around the table,
consuming food and beverages and/or socializing with others around the table while disregarding
the game. The "Executive Club" was open to anyone and there was no actual club or
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organization to which it was restricted. CR 600-601, Rountree Ainf3. There were no signs
prohibiting spectators from purchasing refreshments at the Hawks Nest and taking them over to
the adjacent Executive Club for consumption, or from simply sitting or standing around the
circular tables eating and conversing. CR 650, Joellen Gill (Plaintiffs Human Factors Expert)
AfJ. 87? When Mr. Rountree entered the Executive Club, numerous people were consuming
food and beverages, and not looking at the game while they were occupied conversing with
others. CR 602 Rountree AjJ. ~~9-11. On the evening of his accident, Mr. Rountree did not
observe any warning not to enter the elevated section of the Hawks Nest with food or drink, and
there was no warning not to tum your back on the game or to sit or stand so that you could
observe home plate at all times. CR 603 Rountree AjJ. ~~16.

3. The Gap In Safety Netting In The "Executive Club" At The Extreme End Of Left
Field Appeared To Be An Area That The Boise Hawks Had Determined Needed No
Vertical Protective Netting
After entering the "Executive Club" the Rountrees sat and stood around a table. Mr.
Rountree is not sure if he noticed that there was not any netting at the front of the Executive
Club, but in any event he believed that the area was protected because of the other vertical and
horizontal netting in the areas with tables and was under the impression that the Boise Hawks
had "accessed the safety issues associated with the risk of being hit by foul balls and taken
appropriate action to prevent whatever risk there was." CR 604, Rountree AfJ. ~19. Consistent
with that impression, Mr. Rountree did not warn his grandsons to watch out for foul balls while
in the Executive Club because he "didn't feel the need to be concerned about their safety" or his

Mr. Rountree does not recall any sign deSignating the area in which he was injured as the "Executive
Club" at the time of his accident. Both areas are joined and the "Executive Club" is simply an elevated
portion of the Hawks Nest. CR 600-601, Rountree Aft. 11113, 5.

2
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own. CR 449, Rountree Depo. p. 10011.6-12. 3

4. Mr. Rountree Was Lulled Into A False Sense Of Security
Mr. Rountree was under the impression that the Boise Hawks had determined that the
area that he was in when he was struck by the foul-ball was safe:
19. I was of the belief that those occupying the elevated area of the Hawks Nest where I was
struck by the line-drive foul ball were not at risk of injury from foul balls because the area
overhead was strung with horizontal netting protecting us from pop fly balls, patrons were
invited to seat themselves around tables where it was obvious that they would not all be
watching the game and that the area was sufficiently distant from home plate that it appeared
that the Boise Hawks Management had concluded that its occupants were adequately
protected. While I cannot recall whether or not I observed at that time that the front of the
elevated area where I was struck in the eye was covered with mesh netting, I can say that all
of the other circumstances lead me to believe that the Boise Hawks' Management had
accessed the risk of being hit by foul balls and taken appropriate action to prevent whatever
risk there was.

20. I had come to rely on the fact that in the areas that food and beverages were served and
tables were provided for patrons to sit and converse seated both towards and away from the
ball field, the Boise Hawks Management had assessed the risk of injury from foul balls and
taken the steps necessary to eliminate that risk.
CR 604, Rountree Aff.

~~19,

20. Like Mr. Rountree, his wife, Linda Ballard, was predictably not

paying much if any attention to the ball game at the time of the accident, but was conversing

Both on appeal and in the Court below, the Defendants seek summary judgment at the same time as
they admit that there is conflicting evidence in the record. For example, see Defendants' Brief at 8 in
which they set forth verbatim the testimony of the Plaintiff's wife, Linda Ballard, that they should watch out
for "foul balls" for dramatic effect simply accompanied by a footnote that Mr. Rountree "denied warning
his grandchildren that they needed to watch out for foul balls." Defendants neglect, in their briefing, to
direct the Court's attention to Ms. Ballard's clarifications contained in the deposition to which they cite
clarifying her responses and making it clear that Mr. Rountree's warning regarding the dangers of being
hit by foul balls concerned the area outside of the "Executive Club":
Q. So before you went down there, Bud told your step-grand kids, watch out for foul balls?

3

A. He told them, watch out for balls. And I'm not sure how it's all constructed back there, but
there's times that, you know, kids were running back and forth back there. Because apparently
some foul balls would land there, and they would go shag balls. And I think he was letting his
kids know - or letting Jacob and Luke know that, you know, sometimes balls go back there in the
back part of it, and they might find a foul ball."
CR 462, Ballard Depo. at p. 35 II. 10-20. See, CR 613-614, 628-629, Rountree Aff. Exhibit 3 and 11
showing exposed areas behind the Hawks Nest and Executive Club. Defendants' Opening Brief lacks
candor in that it fails to direct the Court's attention to her clarifying responses which renders her testimony
cited verbatim at most conflicting, and certainly not entirely contradictory of Mr. Rountree's deposition
testimony and affidavit in toto as Defendants imply.
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with a friend and keeping an eye on Mr. Rountree's grandsons, CR 463, Ballard Depo. p. 381.
22 to p. 40 1. 20, as was at least foreseeable, if not intended, in the Hawk's Nest/Executive Club
Multi-Purpose Area by virtue of the Defendants' placement of circular tables and chairs in the
"Executive Club" area where Ms. Ballard and Mr. Rountree were sitting and standing at the time
of the accident. Ms. Ballard was in the "Executive Club" for about 20 minutes before Mr.
Rountree's accident, and was not even aware that there was no netting on the front of the area.
CR 464, Ballard Depo. p. 421. 16 to p. 43 1. 21.

5. Mr. Rountree Loses His Eye Due To A Line-Drive Foul Ball Entering The Gap In
Safety Netting In The "Executive Club"
Mr. Rountree was standing next to a table in the Executive Club, conversing with a
friend. Just before he was struck in the eye by a line-drive foul ball, Mr. Rountree was facing
away from the field towards Glenwood Street. Mr. Rountree turned his head just before he was
hit by the line-drive foul ball because he heard the roar of the crowd. Mr. Rountree did not hear
anyone shout out a warning. CR 443, Rountree Depo. p. 751. 18 to p. 761. 6. From this fact
there arises an inference that few if any people saw the line-drive foul ball approach, or someone
would have shouted a warning.
Ms. Ballard heard the crack of the bat, but did not see the ball until she turned just in time
to see it hit Mr. Rountree in the eye. She ran to where he had fallen, where she found him to be
essentially in a state of shock with his eye "gushing" blood. CR 465-466, Ballard Depo. p. 46 1.
17 to p. 47 1. 23; p. 48 1. 8 to p. 49 1. 1; p. 49 1. 11 to p. 50 1. 9.

6. Human Factors Engineering Analysis
Plaintiff retained Applied Cognitive Sciences, a Human Factors Engineering consulting
group including engineers Richard Gill, Ph.D. and Joellen Gill, to analyze the facts in this case
from the perspective of what the Boise Hawks should have foreseen were the risks involved in
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placing both overhead and vertical safety netting over every section of the Hawk's

Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose Area, save the one opening at the end of left field line where
Mr. Rountree lost his eye to a line drive foul ball. Ms. Gill's knowledge, expertise, analysis and
opinions are relevant to the issues raised by the Defendants as they relate to the factual issues of
perception of risk by the Plaintiff, the Defendants and other occupying the "Executive Club"
during ball games, standards of practice in managing risk, and the feasibility of alternatives for
managing the risk involved in this case. These matters are implicated by the Defendants'
arguments both as to the "Limited Duty Rule and the issue of "Primary Implied Assumption of
Risk." Many circumstances came together making the provision of circular tables, chairs and
stools in an area where the Boise Hawks knew that occupants were sitting and conversing,
distracted from the game, and unprotected by a vertical mesh barrier, a hazard that required
action on the part of the Boise Hawks to protect these patrons. In order to understand what risks
might even be assumed, one needs to understand the particular circumstances inherent in the
configuration of two different and distinct areas of Memorial Stadium. 4

7. Ms. Gill's Qualifications and Investigation
Ms. Gill holds degrees in systems engineering, specializing in Human Factors
Engineering, and Environmental Science and Engineering, specializing in Environmental
Engineering. Ms. Gill has served as a Human Factors Engineer responsible for safety and risk

Ms. Gill's affidavit is lengthy - 22 pages with an additional 60 pages of exhibits. CR 630-711, Gill Aff.
Her qualifications are contained in her curriculum vitae which is attached as Exhibit 1 to her affidavit. CR
652. It is not practical to set forth in this statement of the facts everything that Ms. Gill sets forth in her
affidavit, particularly in view of the page limitations imposed by the Idaho Appellate Rules. Nevertheless,
given the fact that some of the authority relied upon by the Defendants discusses the issue of "consent"
upon which the Defendants based part of their argument for summary judgment, it is important to explore
and understand the human factors involved in the perception and appreciation of risk and the related
issue of what actions any of the parties should reasonably have taken. For this reason, Plaintiff
respectfully requests that the Court read Ms. Gill's affidavit in full. Ms. Gill's analysis includes
considerations of what measures the Boise Hawks should have taken to evaluate the risk both that
patrons occupying the "Executive Club" might be hit by line-drive foul balls, and the risk that those patrons
might not appreciate that risk and would need to be warned of it.

4
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management issues for Martin Marietta Aerospace (weapons systems), Rockwell International
(weapons systems), EG&G (development and implementation of plant wide systems in
accordance with Department of Energy Orders and Best Industry Practices, including programs
for Root Cause Analysis [i.e. so as to determine the underlying causes of accidents and near
misses so that corrective action could be implemented],) and since 1994 as a private consultant
on safety and risk management issues. Ms. Gill inspected the scene ofMr. Rountree's accident
at Memorial Stadium, reviewed the depositions taken in the case, the affidavits filed in the case,
the photographs of the stadium and the accident scene, materials from the Official Web Site of
the Boise Hawks, interviewed Mr. Rountree, and reviewed other pertinent documents.
Ms. Gill provided her affidavit concerning, amongst other things, 1) what the physical
layout of the Hawk's Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose Area was; 2) how the arrangement of
tables, chairs, and safety netting over virtually all of the openings in the Hawk's Nest/Executive

Club Multi-Purpose Area except one, and the lack of warnings, created the appearance that it
was safe for a patron to take his eyes off of the game and divert his attention to food, drink, and
conversation; 3) what the Boise Hawks should have perceived that risk to users of this area of
the stadium (as opposed to the open-bleachers) to be; 4) what actions the Boise Hawks should
have taken to guard against that risk; 5) what warnings were necessary given the particular
circumstances in this case; 6) what Mr. Rountree perceived as the risk of using the area known as
the "Executive Club" as a place to sit, eat and talk without having to keep his attention focused
on the baseball game; and 7) why Mr. Rountree's perceptions and conduct were foreseeable and
reasonable under the circumstances. CR 630-711, Gill Aff.

8. The Contribution of Perceived Risk to Perception in Areas With Safety Netting
From a Human Factors Perspective
Ms. Gill explains that risk management programs involve the identification of hazards
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and the creation and implementation of plans to either eliminate those hazards if feasible, or to
guard against the hazards, if feasible, or in the event that neither is feasible, to adequately warn
against the hazards to allow those who foreseeably may be exposed to the hazard to protect
themselves. CR 632, Gill Aff. ~~11-15. Ms. Gill explains that most activities, and not simply
sporting events, have inherent risks that can be minimized by proper risk management. The
Boise Hawks had such a risk management program, but it was inadequate. CR 633, Gill Aff. ~16.
It is not feasible to eliminate the "inherent risk" posed to spectators in sporting events of the

nature of baseball and hockey 5 by employing the first principal of risk management, "Safety by
Design" because foul balls are an inherent part of the game of baseball, and it is not feasible to
remove spectators out of the potential range of foul balls. CR 648, Gill Aff. ~78. However, when
Safety by Design is not feasible, both guarding and warnings are feasible. CR 648, Gill Aff. ~79.
Protective barriers are a method of guarding that virtually eliminate the "inherent risk" in
attending baseball games. CR 636, Gill Aff.

~34.

Indeed, the Boise Hawks did employ

"guarding" to minimize the risk in areas well beyond what they contend is the "industry
standard" by providing protective netting in front of every area occupied by patrons with the sole
exception of the front of the "Executive Club." CR 648-649, Gill Aff. ~80. Spectators sitting
behind protective barriers will assume that it is safe for them to take their eyes off of the game,
because it appears that someone else (presumably the stadium or arena management) has
recognized the risk of being struck by a foul ball or a stray puck and has taken steps to guard
against that risk. CR 636, Gill Aff.

~33.

The issue of appreciation of risk is somewhat paradoxical. Spectators in unprotected
Open-Bleacher Seating will be aware of the absence of protection from foul balls and therefore

Ms. Gill discusses hockey as well as baseball simply to illustrate that the issues raised by Defendants
are implicated in other sports.

5
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may be expected to be aware of the need to protect themselves by not taking their eyes off of the
game, simply because it is obvious that no one else has taken steps to protect them from that
hazard. CR 636-637, Gill Aff.

~35.

However, spectators in Multi-Purpose Areas will not

necessarily be watching the sporting event, since it will appear to them that projectiles coming
from the field or rink pose very little if any risk due to the protective barriers. For patrons
occupying those areas, it is perfectly safe to disregard the field of play, and divert their attention
to other matters. CR 637, Gill Aff. 36. Conversely, a spectator attending a game in a stadium
with very limited protection (such as those pictured in Exhibit B of Mr. Anderson's affidavit
relied on by Defendants, CR 516-524, depicting stadiums where the only protection is behind
home plate), will appreciate that they are seated in an area in which foul balls are very
hazardous, perceive that there is a high degree of risk that they may be struck by one, and be
prepared to exercise great vigilance in avoiding being struck by a foul ball since it is evident to
them that no one else has taken the precaution of guarding against such an occurrence. CR 637,

Gill Aff. ~38.

In contrast, the greater the extent of protective netting barriers installed in a stadium, the
more likely and foreseeable it is that a spectator will conclude, consciously or unconsciously,
that management has taken steps to guard against any "inherent risks" associated with the game
being played. CR 637, Gill Aff.

~37.

In a stadium such as Memorial Stadium where protective

netting barriers are exceptionally extensive, the perceived risk of being hit by a foul ball is
greatly diminished. CR 638, Gill Aff. ~39. In stadiums where the management has extensively
created safety barriers, patrons will not perceive any "inherent risk" in occupying areas protected
by mesh barriers; any "inherent risk" peculiar to the game of baseball having been rendered
extraneous by virtue of their having entered into a protected zone. CR 638, Gill Aff. 40. While
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Boise Hawks' Management did not create the hazard of foul balls per se, they did exacerbate the
hazard by providing for extensive mesh netting in all spectator areas of the stadium, with the
exception of the Executive Club, an area where it is foreseeable a spectator would be distracted
from watching the game, and where the absence of such netting coupled with the fact that netting
was strung virtually everywhere else in the ball park created a false sense of security and
protection, and by then failing to warn that this area was not fully protected. CR 540-541, 647,
648, 649, Gill Aff. ~~ 54, 73, 77, 81,83.
From a human factors perspective, it is probable that a spectator attending a game in
Memorial Stadium, in which protective barriers have been strung extensively down both foul
lines, and strung both vertically in front of and horizontally over areas where circular tables,
chairs and stools have been placed for the consumption of food and beverages, would reasonably
conclude that Boise Hawks' Management has taken steps to eliminate the risk of their being hit
by a foul ball. Particularly with respect to the areas where patrons ate and drank, the Hawks Nest
and the Executive Club, the erection of horizontal barrier netting protecting the patrons from
being struck by pop-fly balls evidences the management's intention and expectation that
spectators in those areas would not need to protect themselves from that hazard. As such, Boise
Hawks' Management should reasonably have expected that patrons in those areas would be
aware of the presence of such netting and would as a result not feel the need to exercise the
vigilance required in a totally unprotected area signaled by the complete absence of netting. CR

639, Gill Aff.

~~46

and 47. The presence of movable circular tables, chairs and stools (as

opposed to fixed seating such as that found in bleachers) in the Executive Club illustrates that it
is an area within which the operator of the area knew or should have anticipated that some
patrons would be seated faced away from the field of play, eating or conversing, and looking
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away from the field, and hence would not be protecting themselves from foul balls. Eliminating
the need for the occupants of these areas to protect themselves was the intended purpose of
installing the extensive barrier netting. Though Mr. Rahr claims that the Boise Hawks stop
serving food in the Executive Club when the games begin, there is nothing to suggest that those
already seated and eating in that area are warned to discontinue doing so, or to re-orient
themselves so that there eyes do not leave the field of play. CR 640-641, Gill Aff. 54. Indeed
there is evidence to the contrary cited above. Unless the management of the Executive Club
requires all those within it still in the process of consuming food or drinks when the game starts
to vacate the Executive Club or throwaway any unfinished food or drinks (which does not
appear in the record and is contrary to the affidavit of Mr. Rountree) and prohibits those who
have purchased concessions from entering it, the Executive Club cannot be said to act "only as
an alternative location" for people to watch the game. CR 642, Gill Aff. ~58

9. Ms. Gill's Analysis Of Mr. Rountree Perceptions
Based upon Ms. Gill's interview with Mr. Rountree and his deposition, it is apparent that
he did not appreciate the risk that a line-drive foul ball could enter the Executive Club, and that
he therefore thought it was safe for him to engage in conversation standing around a table with
his head turned away from the field. CR 645, Gill Aff. 63. The fact that he would do so was
predictable based upon a number of factors. The extent and placement of vertical barrier netting
in virtually all other areas of the stadium and on top of all of the areas furnished with circular
tables and chairs for eating and drinking caused him to conclude that it was safe to divert his
attention from the baseball game while in the "Executive Club" and converse with others, as
others were doing in that area. CR 645, Gill Aff. 64 and 65. Mr. Rountree was misled by the fact
that there were circular tables, chairs and stools that were placed for eating and drinking in the
completely enclosed Hawks Nest and the Executive Club that was enclosed but for the front of
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that section. These areas have the appearance of being one eating area, albeit that the Executive
Club portion is elevated. This is evident from the photographs of these areas attached to Ms.
Gill's affidavit as Exhibits 5 through 10. CR 646, Gill Aff. ~69, Exhibits 5-10 at CR 681-692.
The angle between the front of the Executive Club and home plate is such that it is not readily
apparent that a line-drive foul ball could enter the front of the Executive Club, as illustrated in
Exhibits 6 and 10 attached to Ms. Gill's affidavit. CR 645, Gill Aff. ~68. Under the
circumstances it was natural for him to assume that the Boise Hawks conscientiously thought out
the means of protection and conclude that it was adequate to protect him from the hazard
involved. CR 645, Gill Aff. ~66. The reasonableness of Mr. Rountree's expectation in this
regard is supported by the Affidavit of Mr. Rahr who contends that he is unaware of any foul ball
having ever entered the Executive Club. IfMr. Rahr, a member of Boise Hawks' Management
believed that there was no risk of a patron in the Executive Club being struck by a foul ball, it
was certainly reasonable for Mr. Rountree to have made that assumption, particularly because it
was Mr. Rahr's responsibility as General Manager to exercise due care to prevent foreseeable
injury to patrons arising from known hazards on the premises, and it was the patrons' right to
assume that he had carried out that responsibility absent some indication that he had not. CR

647, Gill Aff. ~73.
10. The Boise Hawk's General Manager Was Negligent
As a part of the Boise Hawks' Management's evaluation ofthe hazard posed by leaving
the front of the Executive Club unprotected, it was not sufficient for Mr. Rahr to simply rely
upon the fact that others had put up the netting in place when he assumed his position as
President and General Manager of the Boise Hawks in 2004, and simply rely upon the fact that
he was unaware of any foul ball having entered the Executive Club. CR 647, Gill Aff. ~75. The
fact that virtually all of the other areas in the park were protected from being hit by line-drive
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foul balls, and the proximity of the front of the Executive Club to the left field line, should have
caused Mr. Rahr to evaluate whether this one gap in protection posed a hazard. Obviously, this
would have taken very little effort, since most of the rest of the seating and refreshment areas in
the park were already protected by vertical mesh barriers. CR 647-648, Gill AfJ. ~76.
In sum, Boise Hawks voluntarily elected to provide protective netting in front of all other
areas occupied by patrons, and over all areas furnished with chairs and tables for patrons to eat
and drink where the Boise Hawks knew they were not necessarily watching the game. By
leaving the job unfinished, and because of the unique set of circumstances described above, the
Boise Hawks created a false sense of security that such areas were fully protected and that it had
determined that no hazard was posed to them by the sole open space fronting on the very end of
left field.
11. Defendant Home Plate Food Services, Inc.'s Control Of The Hawks NestlExecutive
Club
Home Plate Food Services, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment was supported by a
single legal conclusion contained in the affidavit of Todd Rahr in which he states: "Home Plate
Food Services, LLC ("Home Plate") has been a food and beverage concessionaire at Memorial
Stadium since 2006. At the time of the subject accident, Home Plate did not operate, maintain,
and/or control any area of Memorial Stadium." CR 553, Rahr AfJ. ~23. It is not clear what Mr.
Rahr means by the terms he employs in his affidavit, but the record contains evidence that Mr.
Rountree had reserved a table at which to eat in the Hawks Nest, CR 601, Rountree AfJ. ~5, and
that he and his family were served by a waitress in that dining area, and she apparently agreed to hold
their table awaiting their return from the Executive Club. CR 439, Rountree Depo. p. 58 1. 8 to p. 59

1. 5.
As the District Court observed, it did not address Defendant Home Plate Food Service, Inc.'s
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motion for summary judgment in its Memorandum Decision On Defendants Motion For Summary
Judgment, CR 804-812, because it "wasn't teed up real well" in the original submission of

Defendants' motion for summary judgment. See, Transcript ofJune 22, 2011 Hearing, p. 101. 21
to p. 11 1. 17. The District Court was correct in this regard, since the only argument on summary
judgment specific to Defendant Home Plate Food Service, Inc. is contained in footnote in the
Defendants' memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment:
"6 Neither Home Plate nor Memorial Stadium have any liability under a premises liability
theory as neither was the land owner and neither had any control over netting at the
stadium. Boise Baseball, LLC, also has no liability as a mere owner of the Boise Hawks,
because it had no control over the stadium. Only one with control of the premises may be
liable under a premises theory. Boots, ex reI., Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393
(Ct.App. 2008). If Plaintiffs theory against these Defendants is simple negligence, then
summary judgment is appropriate because there is no evidence of an act or omission by
any of them that constitutes negligence. See Cramer v. Slaton, 146 Idaho 868, 873 (2009)
(negligence elements).

CR 580. Not only was the motion "not well teed up" but discovery was still ongoing at the time that

Defendants motion for interlocutory appeal was granted. Plaintiff was then attempting to depose Mr.
Rahr, the general manager of the Boise Hawks who also operates Home Plate Food Services, Inc.
Mr. Rountree did not move for relief under I.R.Civ.P. 56(f) precisely because Home Plate Food
Services, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment was not squarely presented, though Mr. Rountree
argued for the equivalent of such relief at the hearing on the motion for reconsideration and
prevailed, as was agreed to at the hearing on Defendants' motion for reconsideration. 6

The Court: Okay. All right. If you look at a very broad view of the negligence issue involved and how that
could relate to Home Plate, I think Mr. Seiniger's made a point that -- let me think. I don't know. I don't
know if Home Plate had any duty to put up a sign. They had no right to control. I don't know. Maybe it's
something you need to explore more in deposition because I don't know that they owed a duty. That's the
question, if they did. And Mr. Seiniger appears to say, well, because of the situation, table and chairs
where they were, that maybe they had a duty to warn or something.

6

Mr. Seiniger: And I think we can resolve that problem with one or two depositions that I've already sent a
notice on.
Mr. Evett: And that's fine. I can -The Court: You can come back on that one with Home Plate.
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Mr. Rountree consented to the Court's granting Memorial Stadium (but not Home Plate Food

Service, Inc.) summary judgment, which it did. CR 917. Though the depositions of Boise
Baseball, LLC and Home Plate Food Service were noticed at the time of the hearing on
Defendant Home Plate Food Service, Inc.'s motion for reconsideration, they could not be taken
because of the automatic stay following this Court's granting of Defendants' motion to appeal.
See, Affidavit of Wm Breck Seiniger Jr in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Reconsideration
and Interlocutory Appeal, CR 882-900. Mr. Rountree should have the opportunity to conclude
that discovery prior to having this issue determined.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Should the District Court have granted Plaintiff s Motion to Strike Portions of the
Affidavit of Ron Anderson?
ARGUMENT

1. Resolution Of The Issues Raised By Defendant In This Appeal Will Not Serve The
Purposes Of Idaho Appellate Rule 12
"The intent of Idaho Appellate Rule 12 is to provide an immediate appeal from an
interlocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of
first impression are involved."
Aardema v. Us. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d 505,509 (2009). As is
evident from the statement of facts in this matter, this case does not involve substantial legal
issues of great public interest. Though legal questions of first impression may appear to be
involved, they ought not be decided in the absence of a fully developed record for policy reasons,
Mr. Evett: Sure. And maybe we can work it out withThe Court: Memorial Stadium, right?
Mr. Evett: Yet.
Mr. Seiniger: Yeah. I don't really have a problem with their being out.
The Court: Okay. All right. Thank you.
Transcript of June 22, 2011 Hearing, p. 25 I. 4 to p. 26 I. 6.
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particularly in light of the fact that the flexible definition of duty previously announced by this
Court adequately contemplates the concerns raised by the Defendants, as discussed below.
Fundamentally, before this Court or the legislature limits anyone's duty, it makes sense to
determine whether or not that duty needs to be limited. That observation may sound almost
tautological, but it goes to whether an adequate showing has been made by the Defendants that a
limitation of duties is required in this case or in any case. Plaintiff believes that that there is
more than enough evidence in the record to demonstrate that the Hawks Nest/Executive Club
Multi-Purpose Area is an area to which the "Limited Duty Rule" should not apply. However, if

this Court believes otherwise, it should defer decision at least until discovery is completed in this
case. The depositions of the Defendants have not even been taken yet, though Plaintiff
attempted to take them as discussed above. 7
Consideration Of The "Limited Duty Rule" And/Or "Primary Implied Assumption Of
Risk" Doctrine Should Be Reserved For A Case In Which The Party Opposing Adoption
Has A Greater Incentive To Develop An Appropriate Record
There is a "chicken littlesque" quality to the central thrust of Defendant's concern for
little leaguers, playgrounds, etc., that is totally without support in the record. Defendants argue:
For instance, does this mean that every time anyone plays basketball at the park they need
to have everyone they intend to play with either orally say "I consent to the risk
involved," or sign a written release from each player stating that they will not hold the
identified individual liable for an injury that occurs while playing the game?
App. Brief at. 42. That rhetorical question merits some reflection, not because it is a compelling

reason to adopt limited to a rule, but because it implicates consideration of the showing that
should be made by anyone urging this Court to adopt a limited duty, immunity or the doctrine of
Primary Implied Assumption of the Risk within a particular context.

This Court has observed most emphatically:
7 The Deposition of Mr. Rahr was taken, but its scope was limited by stipulation to the identification of the
entities involved that might have potential liability.
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Furthennore, the "all-or-nothing" effect of application of the assumption of risk defense
is inequitable. It runs counter to all sense of reason and fairness. This is particularly true
in today's age of comparative negligence; it would be the ultimate legal inconsistency to
reject contributory negligence as an absolute defense yet at the same time allow its effect
to continue under the guise of assumption of risk. The scope of I.C. § 6-801 is broad. It is
not limited to certain types of action; it is not limited by exceptions. Rather, it covers any
action in which the plaintiff is seeking to recover on grounds of negligence. Section 6801's intent is clear: Contributory negligence is not to be a complete bar to recovery;
instead, liability is to be apportioned between the parties based on the degree of fault for
which each is responsible.
Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 989, 695 P.2d 369, 374 (1985). Citations to footnotes

omitted. This court is not simply being asked to add on to standards already set by common law,
it is being asked to alter the legislature's declaration of Idaho's comparative negligence law.
Obviously, the legislature has adopted comparative negligence and a number of statutes
involving immunities and the limitation of duties. Many of those enactments are codified in
Idaho Code Title 6 Chapters 8-29. The legislature has not acted to limit the duty of the owners
and operators of baseball stadiums, presumably because no showing has been made that there is
any need to do so. Defendants argue that the District Court misread Ruffing'S statement of
restraint with respect to expanding the "fireman's rule": "These concerns, along with the narrow
scope the plain language of the rule commands, lead us to conclude we should read the rule
narrowly here. It is the Legislature'S prerogative to expand the rule should it desire to do so."
Ruffing v. Ada County Paramedics, 145 Idaho 943, 946, 188 P.3d 885, 888 (2008). Defendants

misconstrue the District Court's decision. The District Court simply recognized this Court's
admonition favoring restraint in expanding or creating exceptions to the statutory scheme of
negligence in Idaho.
The record below contains no evidence supporting the need for any limitation duty or
exception to the general law of negligence. Presumably, before the legislature adopts immunity
or standard of care more strict than ordinary negligence (as in the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Title
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Six Chapter 9; the Medical Malpractice act, title six Chapter 10; the Idaho Sport Shooting
Immunities Act, Title Six Chapter 27; the Livestock Immunities Act, Title Six Chapter 29; etc.)
the proponents of the acts make some showing that a limitation of the general law of negligence
is needed, either because of the unavailability of insurance, the prevalence of frivolous lawsuits,
evidence that people are avoiding involvement in the activity that is the subject to the act, etc.
Even with respect to the activities that have been selected by the legislature as appropriate
subjects for restrictions of the general law of negligence, such activities are not given blanket
immunity as is reflected by the legislation referenced above. Nothing in the record suggests that
people are fleeing from involvement in the game of baseball. Schools already have immunities
that would cover baseball games. There is no evidence that those who conduct games cannot
obtain insurance. Indeed in this case there is a substantial insurance policy issued at a time when
Idaho's comparative negligence law presumably set the standards for liability and, therefore,
indemnification.
In short, there is no evidence that this Court's present articulation of the flexible standard
of duty applicable to businesses is insufficient to address the issues presented in this case. Even
with respect to cases involving injured in Open-Bleacher Seating, it would seem appropriate to
require a defendant to make a showing of facts demonstrating the necessity of an exception to
this Court's presently articulated standards of duty in cases involving comparative negligence
before a plaintiff would have any burden to put forth facts proving the adequacy of Idaho's
present common law of negligence. Otherwise, a plaintiff would essentially be placed in a
position of having to prove a negative. Though everyone might wish to have immunity for their
acts and omissions or limited duties, nothing in the record in this case indicates that there is a
compelling need to create exceptions to the general rules of negligence in the context of baseball
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games as a matter of judicial policy, even in the context of Memorial Stadium's Open Bleacher
Seating, never mind its Multi-Purpose Area. Why should baseball have limited duties and not
hockey, or basketball, or every other activity in which people gather to watch sporting events
that pose some risk of injury to spectators? Despite the nostalgic quality evident in some of the
baseball cases cited by the defendants, it is difficult to see why baseball deserves any greater
protection than any other activity in which spectators may be injured.
For Reasons Of Judicial Policy It Would Be Unwise To Adopt The "Limited Duty Rule"
And/Or "Primary Implied Assumption Of Risk" Doctrine In This Case, On This Record
Defendant seeks a sweeping declaration of immunity in this case. Consideration of the
"Limited Duty Rule" and "primary implied assumption of risk" doctrine at this point in the
proceedings might make some sense if the facts of this case did not distinguish it from cases
involving injuries sustained from foul balls by patrons of baseball games seated in OpenBleacher Seating. However, there is a stark and obvious factual distinction between an injury
caused by a foul ball in Open-Bleacher Seating and one caused by a foul ball in any MultiPurpose Area designated for eating/drinking/socializing in which Defendant serves alcohol and
which has been configured so that it is apparent that it is intended that stadium patrons will be
engaged in activities other than simply watching a baseball game and "keeping their eyes on the
balL" It was in such an area that Mr. Rountree was engaged in conversation, paying no attention
to the baseball game, as were other patrons and employees serving refreshments. Was it the

expectation of the Defendants that these employees never take their eyes off of the game?
Hardly.
This distinction is critical to both the analysis of the issues raised by Defendant, and the
appropriateness of considering those issues in an interlocutory appeaL Defendants essentially
ask this Court for an advisory opinion, in that the facts in this case so far removed it from those
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involving injuries from foul balls sustained by patrons of baseball games simply seated in OpenBleacher Seating, that Mr. Rountree need not and does not intend to make any argument at all

with respect to whether or not this Court should adopt the "Limited Duty Rule" and "primary
implied assumption of risk" doctrine within that context, where he readily admits that there is at
least some justification for the rule and doctrine making it worthy of consideration by this Court.
While there may be sound reasons why those rules should not apply within the context of OpenBleacher Seating, Mr. Rountree will not make them here, because he believes that the particular

facts of his case require the application of this Court's general negligence law irrespective of
whether this Court eventually adopts the "Limited Duty Rule" andlor "primary implied
assumption of risk" with respect to other cases involving injuries sustained by patrons in OpenBleacher Seating.

Mr. Rountree urges this Court to defer declaring whether or not it will adopt the "Limited
Duty Rule" andlor "primary implied assumption of risk" to an appropriate case involving a

spectator injured in Open-Bleacher Seating, and to decline to do so in this case due to the unique
facts presented in this case and because doing so in this case will not "materially advance the
orderly resolution of the litigation." See Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 665 P.2d 701 (1983). It
may be that if someone injured by a foul ball in Open-Bleacher Seating is unwise enough to
bring a law suit subject to Idaho's hybrid comparative negligence law based on the legal theory
that all Open-Bleacher Seating should be covered with safety netting, this Court may have to
address the issues raised by Defendants. Of course, the fact that this Court has not been
presented with such a case given the prevalence of sporting activities is some indication that
those injured at such events do not bring law suits under normal circumstances. This case does
not present normal circumstances, and Mr. Rountree submits that the special circumstances of
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this case suggest both why he brought his action, and why it does not implicate consideration of
the duty owed to patrons in Open-Bleacher Seating.

2. The Court Should Not Adopt The "Limited Duty Rule"
Defendants argue that this Court should adopt the "Limited Duty Rule" or "Baseball
Rule" and grant them summary judgment. Under this rule the only duty that the operator of a
baseball game has is (1) there must be screening for the area of the field behind home plate
where the danger of being struck by a ball is the greatest; and (2) such screening must be of
sufficient extent to provide adequate protection for as many spectators as may reasonably be
expected to desire such seating in the course of an ordinary game.
Defendants Have Not Shown That Imposing Liability In This Case Implicates The Policy
Considerations Implicit In The Cases That Have Considered The "Limited Duty Rule"
Although some cases have applied the "Limited Duty Rule" to concession areas ancillary
to Open-Bleacher Seating, it is clear that the rule finds its justification in areas of stadiums
intended for unprotected viewing, other than those directly behind home plate. This case
involves liability for negligently designing, constructing or maintaining a Multi-Purpose Area
outside Memorial Stadium's Open-Bleacher Seating in which Defendants invite patrons to
disregard the game and divert their attention elsewhere if they so choose. CR 635-638, Gill Aff.8

8 Virtually all of the area behind home plate and down both the right field and left field foul lines is
protected by mesh protective netting of the variety shown in Exhibit 4. Gill Aff. 1124.

Along the third base line are adjoining refreshment areas located parallel to the third base/left field
lines. Those areas are depicted in Exhibits 5 to 11. As depicted in those exhibits, these areas do not
have fixed seating. such as is found in the bleacher areas. but are furnished with Circular tables. chairs
and stools. Gill Aff. 1125.
Attached hereto as Exhibits 14 through 17 are diagrams taken from a web page deSignated as the
"Official Site of the Boise Hawks." ... Gill Aff. 1126.
Exhibit 16 depicts the area of the box seats at Memorial Stadium and the Hawks Nest Picnic Area.
No separate area is designated as the "Executive Club" in Exhibit 16. Gill Aff. 1128.
Exhibit 17 is a page from the Boise Hawks Official Site stating that the Executive Club serves
beverages and h'ordeuvres beginning 45 minutes before the first pitch. Gill Aff. 1129.
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Such Multi-Purpose Areas are increasingly common in modem sports facilities. Plaintiff has
included in the record examples of other such Multi-Purpose Areas which are becoming a
standard feature at stadiums and arenas. 9
Defendants ask this Court to impose a rule of law developed with respect to the risks
inherent in unprotected Open-Bleacher Seating to Multi-Purpose Areas where it is not only
foreseeable that people will have their attention diverted from the game, but intended. Whatever
justification the "Limited Duty Rule" may have to Open-Bleacher Seating, it has no application
to designated dining and socializing areas all but completely surrounded by protective netting.
This is particularly true because of the purpose of the "Limited Duty Rule" when contrasted with
the voluntary duty rule. Even in Open-Bleacher Seating areas, it is one thing to say that a
stadium operator has no duty to erect protective netting beyond the backstop area, and another to
say that protective netting voluntarily erected beyond that area need not be installed and
maintained with due care. Presumably, even under "the Limited Duty Rule" a spectator injured
when a foul ball bursts through rotted netting would have a cause of action, because the
voluntary duty rule would apply. The very existence of protective netting implies to the
spectator that risk has been eliminated, particularly in protected Multi-Purpose Area. In contrast,
unprotected Open-Bleacher Seating carries with it an implicit warning understood by

Boise Hawks' Management erected vertical protective mesh netting in front of all of the seating in the
stadium. with the sole exception of the area in front of the Executive Club where Plaintiff's eye was struck.
Gill Aft. 1{42.
Finally Boise Hawks Management erected horizontally strung a protective barrier over the entire top
of the seating area where circular tables. chairs and stools were provided and in which food and
beverages were served before and during the games. See Exhibits 5 through 10 attached hereto. Gill
Aft. 1{44.
9 See, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Joel/en Gill and
Portions of the Affidavit of Bud Rountree discussing the misleading affidavit of Defendants' expert Ron
Anderson and demonstrating examples of mixed-use areas at Safeco Field in Seattle, WA, CR 786-787,
and the attached exhibits showing mixed-use areas at Qwest Arena Grand Entertainment Suites and
Bronco Stadium's Sky Boxes.
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spectators. 10
Idaho's Flexible General Standard of Duty Sufficiently Protects The Interests Urged By
Defendants In Support Of The "Limited Duty Rule"
In one sense, Idaho already has a "Limited Duty Rule":
The elements of a common law negligence action include a duty, recognized by law,
requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct, a breach of that duty,
a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and resulting injuries, and actual
loss or damage. Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 489, 903 P.2d 73, 78 (1995). When
determining if a breach of duty occurred, the defendant's conduct must be measured
against that of an ordinarily prudent person acting under all the circumstances and
conditions then existing.ld. at 491,903 P.2d at 80.
Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 759,40 P.3d 110, 117 (2002). Open-Bleacher Seating presents
a compelling set of circumstances limiting the duty of the Defendants. Defendants are free to
10
In general, spectators sitting behind protective barriers will assume that it is safe for them to take
their eyes off of the game, because it appears that someone else (presumably the stadium or arena
management) has recognized the risk of being struck by a foul ball or stray puck and has taken steps to
guard against that risk. Gill Aft. 1133.
By installing protective barriers behind home plate, such as those illustrated in Exhibit B to the
Affidavit of Ron Anderson In Support Of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the risk for those
sitting behind the barriers of being struck by a line-drive foul ball, such as the one that struck Mr.
Rountree, are virtually eliminated. Gill Aft. 1134.
Spectators in the bleacher seats completely unprotected by barrier netting as illustrated in Exhibit B
attached to Mr. Anderson's affidavit will be aware of the absence of protection from foul balls and
therefore may be expected to be aware of the need to protect themselves by not taking their eyes off of
the game, simply because it is obvious that no one else has taken steps to protect them from that hazard.

Gill Aff. 1135.
Just as with those seated behind the protective barriers described in Mr. Anderson's affidavit, patrons
of stadiums and arenas utilizing protected areas will not necessarily be watching the sporting event, since
it will be obvious to them that projectiles coming from the field or rink pose very little if any risk due to the
protective barriers. For patrons occupying those areas, it is perfectly safe to disregard the field of play,
and divert their attention to other matters. They are implicitly invited to do so by management furnishing
seating configured so that some of the occupants of chairs and stools sitting around a table will face away
from the field or rink. Gill Aft. 1136.
Indeed, the greater the extent of protective netting barriers installed in a stadium, the more likely and
foreseeable it is that a spectator will conclude, consciously or unconsciously, that management has taken
steps to guard against any "inherent risks" associated with the game being played. Gill Aft. 1137.
Thus, it is likely that a spectator attending a game in a stadium with very limited protection, such as
those pictured in Exhibit B of Mr. Anderson's affidavit, will appreciate that they are seated in any area in
which foul balls are very hazardous, perceive that there is a high degree of risk that they may be struck by
one, and be prepared to exercise great vigilance in avoiding being struck by a foul ball since it is evident
to them that no one else has taken the precaution of guarding against such an occurrence.
Conversely, in a stadium such as Memorial Stadium where protective netting barriers are
exceptionally extensive, the perceived risk of being hit by a foul ball is greatly diminished. Gill Aft. 1138, 39.
As a practical matter, in such areas patrons will not perceive any "inherent risk" in occupying areas
protected by mesh barriers; any "inherent risk" peculiar to the game of baseball having been rendered
extraneous by virtue of their having entered into a protected zone. Gill Aff. 1140.
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argue to the District Court that under the circumstances, the Boise Hawks had no duty as a matter
oflaw to the Plaintiff without having to resort to "Limited Duty Rule," the "Baseball Rule,"
"Primary Implied Assumption of the Risk," or another other proposed exception to Idaho's
comparative negligence law. Such an argument might or might not be found to be compelling in

an appropriate case, particularly one involving Open-Bleacher Seating. Indeed, that is precisely
what the Boise Hawks did below. The District Court found that there were circumstances
demonstrated in the record that created a duty.
The "Limited Duty Rule" Contemplates Cases Involving Primarily Open-Bleacher
Seating And Is Not Appropriate For Multi-Purpose Areas Of Stadiums And Arenas
Designed By Owners To Be Used For Purposes Inconsistent With The Rule's
Application
Application of the "Limited Duty Rule" runs contrary to this Court's carefully crafted
enunciation of the duty of a business. "Every person, in the conduct of his business, has a duty
to exercise ordinary care to 'prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others.'" Turpen
v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669,672 (1999). This Court has further clarified that
general rule:
"In determining whether a duty will arise in a particular context, the Court has identified
several factors to consider. [T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved." (Citations omitted.)
Turpen 247,672. Wisely, Turpin articulated a balancing test for determining duty. As to
foreseeability, Turpin observes:
"Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the circumstances of each case.
Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively
low degree of foreseeability is required." [Citation omitted.]
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Turpen, 247-48,672-73. The facts of this case could hardly present a more glaring example of a

situation in which "the degree of result or harm is great" -- the loss of an eye -- "but preventing it
is not difficult." Beyond the Open-Bleacher Seating, the Hawks Nest/Executive Club MultiPurpose Area was completely protected from foul balls by vertically and horizontally strung

safety netting, other than the one opening at the end of left field through which the line drive foul
ball entered and hit Mr. Rountree. CR 679696, 708, 710, Gill Aff. Exhibits 4-12, 18, 19. The
Hawks Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose Area was designed for people to take their eyes off of

the game while sitting and standing around circular tables socializing. Mr. Rountree was injured
when a line drive foul ball entered through the sole opening in the Hawks Nest/Executive Club
Multi-Purpose Area at the end of left field that Defendants neglected to cover with safety netting.

This Multi-Purpose Area is beyond the focus of any legitimate consideration of the "Limited
Duty Rule."

Idaho has not adopted the procrustean bed of the "Limited Duty Rule," and the facts of
this case illustrate perfectly why it should not. Adoption of the "Limited Duty Rule" would not
only preclude liability where "degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult"
but would likely operate to preclude application ofthe voluntary duty rule. As noted in Turpin:
[a] person can also assume a duty to act for the protection of another. Bowling v. Jack B.
Parson Companies, 117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 793 P.2d 703, 705 (1990). The underlying
policy here arises from a person voluntarily assuming a position, and by filling that
position another can reasonably rely on that person to act with reasonable care and
provide protection from unreasonable risks of harm.
Turpen 248,673. The facts of this case demonstrate irrefutably that whatever the result of the

analysis under the test discussed in Turpin, the Boise Hawks voluntarily accepted the duty to use
due care in erected mesh netting barriers in virtually every other area of the stadium, and every
other area ofthe stadium offering table seating for purposes of eating, drinking and socializing.
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The Authority Cited By The Defendants Distinguishes Between Open-Bleacher Seating
and Multi-Purpose Areas
Defendants cite Liability to spectator at baseball game who is hit by ball or injured as

result of other hazards ofgame, 91 A.L.R.3d 24 (Originally published in 1979) in support of
their position, but neglect to direct the Court's attention to a pertinent portion of the article:
§ 3.5. Standard of care for areas ofthe baseball stadium outside of stands: The following
authority considered the standard of care for areas of the baseball stadium outside of the
stands.
The proper standard of care for areas of the baseball stadium outside of stands is the
"business invitee rule," which provides that a landowner owes a duty of reasonable
care to guard against any dangerous conditions on his or her property that the owner
either knows about or should have discovered. Phelps v. State, 2005 WL 2205633
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2005)
The Limited Duty Rule which restricts tort liability of baseball stadium owners and
operators to spectators struck by baseballs applies to injuries occurring in the stands;
however, traditional rules of negligence, specifically the business invitee rule, will
govern owner and operator liability for injuries that occur in all other areas of the
stadium. Maisonave v. Newark Bears Professional Baseball Club, Inc., 185 N.J. 70,
881 A.2d 700 (2005).
City, home and visiting baseball clubs, and batter all owed injured child a duty to
exercise ordinary care for his safety, as it was foreseeable that ball hit during batting
practice would clear outfield fence and land in picnic area where child was sitting.
Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball Club, LLC, 216 P.3d 827 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009),
cert. granted, (Sept. 15,2009).
91 A.L.R.3d 24 (Originally published in 1979), Cumulative Supplement; Emphasis supplied. ll
Despite the clear language that assumption of the risk poses a "complete bar to suit" and serves
as a "complete defense" resulting from an injury resulting form being struck by a baseball
"anywhere on the premises" during a professional baseball game, the New Jersey Supreme Court
In the section ofthe New Mexico Supreme Court's opinion in Edward C. v. City of

Albuquerque, 148 N.M. 646, 653, 241 P.3d 1086, 1093, (2010), (the final decision in Crespin)
Maisonave was superseded by passage 0 f New Jersey: 2A:53A-46 which eliminated its two-tier duty.
Sciarrotta v. Global Spectrum, 194 N.J. 345, 944 A.2d 630 (2008). However, Maisonave's reasoning
remains compelling.
11
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entitled "The History And Development OfA Baseball Rule," it reviews the pertinent
jurisprudence and law review articles considering the so-called "Baseball Rule." Its review
leaves little doubt that it is incompatible with comparative negligence:
From the earliest cases, the legal theories underlying the baseball rule precluding
recovery have been the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. See
Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n, 3 Ca1.2d 725, 46 P.2d 144, 147 (1935) (per curiam).
("[I]n accepting the unscreened seat, even temporarily, with full knowledge of the danger
attached to so doing, [plaintiff] assumed the risk of injury, which precluded recovery of
damages."); Crane, 153 S.W. at 1078 ("And ifit could not be said that [plaintiff]
assumed the risk, still he should not be allowed to recover, since his own contributory
negligence [for choosing an unprotected seat] is apparent and indisputable.").
Edward C. summarizes Maisonave 's discussion of the problems with the baseball rule:

Aside from shifts in tort law, advances in the game and the business of baseball have also
been significant factors contributing to court modification of the traditional baseball rule.
The common theme among contemporary cases modifying the traditional baseball rule is
that spectators injured by baseballs are generally allowed to advance their claim when the
injury is the result of some circumstance, design, or conduct neither necessary nor
inherent in the game.
For example, in Maisonave, 881 A.2d at 706-D7, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized that "[i]t would be unfair to hold owners and operators [of baseball stadiums]
liable for injuries to spectators in the stands when the potential danger of fly balls is an
inherent, expected, and even desired part of the baseball fan's experience." Accordingly,
the court applied the Akins baseball rule only within the stands-areas "dedicated solely
to viewing the game," id at 707, where fly balls are inherent, expected, and even desired.
"In contrast, Multi-Purpose Areas, such as concourses and playground areas, are outside
the scope of the rule," id at 707, and are subject to "a duty of reasonable care," id at 709.
In these Multi-Purpose Areas, "[t]he validity of the baseball rule diminishes" because
"[f]ans foreseeably and understandably let down their guard when they are in other areas
of the stadium" where the fan "is no longer trying to catch foul balls or even necessarily
watching the game," id at 708, and so fly balls are neither expected nor desired.
The New Jersey court understood that applying the "old [baseball rule] to a sport that has
changed tremendously in the last seventy years" poses "pragmatic difficult[ies]." Id
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Specifically, the court noted that players
are faster and stronger than in the past, and marketing techniques employed at games
create "a sensory overload of distractions," id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); therefore, "[t]he limited duty rule does not accommodate all of the activities
that are part oftoday's game, nor does it take into account that players can hit baseballs
harder and farther." Id
Additionally, the Maisonave court also expressed concern about the ability of the
spectators to protect themselves from balls leaving the field of play. Id at 708-09 .... the
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Maisonave court echoed a prominent concern raised by the dissent in Akins. "The [Akins]
ruling will ... foreclose juries in the future from considering the wide range of
circumstances of individual cases, as well as new developments in safety devices or
procedures .... [The Akins Court] has frozen a position that is certain to become outdated,
if it is not already." Akins, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 424 N.E.2d at 537 (Cooke, C.J.,
dissenting).
Edward C. v. City ofAlbuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, 148 N.M. 646, 654, 241 P.3d 1086, 1094.
Emphasis supplied. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded by announcing a rule of law in
line with "the vast majority of jurisdictions" which is essentially simply a restatement of
comparative negligence:
... we reject the baseball rule pronounced in Akins because of its extreme and unyielding
results. Instead, we modifY the duty owed by commercial baseball stadium
owners/occupants.
We hold, therefore, that an owner/occupant of a commercial baseball stadium owes a
duty that is symmetrical to the duty of the spectator. Spectators must exercise ordinary
care to protect themselves from the inherent risk of being hit by a projectile that leaves
the field of play and the owner/occupant must exercise ordinary care not to increase that
inherent risk. ... While not of paramount concern, this approach will bring New Mexico
in line with the vast majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue.
Edward C. v. City ofAlbuquerque, 201 0-NMSC-043 , 148 N.M. 646, 657-58, 241 P.3d 1086,
1097-98. Time and space preclude the dismantling of every case cited by the Boise Hawks in
support of "Limited Duty Rule" or "baseball rule," but as Edward C. and Maisonave make clear,
the rules are outmoded and in decline.
The Statutory "Limited Duty Rules" Belie The Appropriateness of Granting The Relief
Defendants Seek
Defendants argue that other states have adopted "Limited Duty Rules." This contention is
interesting both because it suggests that the Defendants might more appropriately take their
concerns to the legislature, and because of the statutes they point to generally require posted
warnings (Ms. Gill states that specific warnings were needed, CR 646 ~71, 646 ~649), or liability
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for negligently designed or maintained protected seating. 12 In any event, because none of these

12

Colorado:
(5) Nothing in subsection (4) of this section shall prevent or limit the liability of an owner who:
(a) Fails to make a reasonable and prudent effort to design, alter, and maintain the premises of
the stadium in reasonably safe condition relative to the nature of the game of baseball;
(c) Fails to post and maintain the warning signs required pursuant to subsection (6) of this
section.
(6)(a) Every owner of a stadium where professional baseball games are played shall post and
maintain signs which contain the warning notice specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (6).
Such signs shall be placed in conspicuous places at the entrances outside the stadium and at
stadium facilities where tickets to professional baseball games are sold. The warning notice specified
in paragraph (b) of this subsection (6) shall appear on the sign in black letters, with each letter to be a
minimum of one inch in height.
(b) The signs described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (6) shall contain the following warning
notice:
WARNING: Under Colorado Law, A Spectator Of Professional Baseball Assumes The Risk Of
Any Injury To Person Or Property Resulting From Any Of The Inherent Dangers And Risks Of
Such Activity And May Not Recover From An Owner Of A Baseball Team Or An Owner Of A
Stadium Where Professional Baseball Is Played For Injury Resulting From The Inherent Dangers
And Risks Of Observing Professional Baseball, Including But Not Limited To, Being Struck By A
Baseball Or A Baseball Bat.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-120. Under this statute, the gap left by the Defendants in the otherwise
ubiquitous netting surrounding and covering the Hawks Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose Area would
certainly at least raise an issue of fact for the jury to determine in applying Colorado's law.
Illinois: Liability limited. The owner or operator of a baseball facility shall not be liable for any injury to
the person or property of any person as a result of that person being hit by a ball or bat unless: (1) the
person is situated behind a screen, backstop, or similar device at a baseball facility and the screen,
backstop, or similar device is defective (in a manner other than in width or height) because of the
negligence of the owner or operator of the baseball facility; or IL ST CH 745 § 38/10.
Arizona: Defendants cite Arizona's "Limited Duty Rule, but the exceptions in that rule do not help
Defendants either:
B. This section does not prevent or limit the liability of an owner who fails to maintain the
premises of the baseball stadium in a reasonably safe condition.

E. This section does not prevent or limit liability of a registered design professional or a licensed
contractor who fails to design, construct or operate the premises of the baseball stadium in a
reasonably safe condition or manner.
F. As used in this section:
3. "Protective seating" means either:
(a) An area in which a screen to prevent a ball or bat from entering the seating area
exists between the spectator and the playing field.
(b) An area that is reasonably safe for the avoidance of injuries from baseballs, baseball
bats or other eqUipment used by players during a baseball game.

- 31 -

statutes appear to contemplate Multi-Purpose Areas, they demonstrate primarily how little
deliberation must have been given to them.
Defendants' Failed To Present Admissible Evidence Of Relevant "Industry Standards"
And Such Standards Are Rebuttable
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) which provides:
Supporting or opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein ...
I.R.Civ.P. 56(e) states that affidavits presented in support of motions for summary judgment must
contain admissible evidence. See, e.g., Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho
778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). Conc1usory statements, statements based on hearsay,
statements that lack adequate foundation, and statements not made on personal knowledge are
insufficient. See, e.g., State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partners, 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P .2d 977,
981 (1995). Since the "Limited Duty Rule" establishes a duty as a matter oflaw, and not one
based upon "industry standards," the determination of what constitutes "industry standards" is
not a factual issue relevant to any issue on appeal. Yet, Defendants have taken a shot-gun
approach, and thrown their purported evidence of "industry standards" in for good measure.
The Defendants argue "Memorial Stadium exceeds industry standards by providing extra
barrier netting almost all the way down the first-base and third-base lines at Memorial Stadium."
Defendants quote their proclaimed expert Mr. Anderson "[t]he barrier netting at Memorial
Stadium has more extensive coverage than any other baseball stadium I have worked on or
observed in my 43 years in the netting industry." By way ofMr. Anderson's qualifications, his
affidavit establishes only his experience as a salesman and installer of netting, and his passing
acquaintance with a handful of baseball fields he has worked on, almost all of which are located
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-554. Presumably under Arizona law the Hawks Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose
Area are "protected seating" that was not maintained in a reasonably safe condition.
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in his home state of Washington. 13 Mr. Anderson's affidavit does not even mention Multi-

Purpose Areas. Mr. Anderson's averments assume a number of facts. First, that "industry
standards" applicable to the issues in this case exists. Second, that Mr. Anderson's experience in
installing netting has made him aware of them. Third, that any alleged "industry standard" for
the installation of safety netting in Open-Bleacher Seating is the applicable "industry standard"
for Multi-Purpose Areas. There is insufficient foundation for Mr. Anderson's averment
concerning the existence of, and the Defendants compliance with, any alleged "industry
standard." For this reason, Mr. Rountree moved to strike ~12 of Mr. Anderson's affidavit. CR
772. See, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of

Ron Anderson, CR 774-780.
As May Be Inferred From The Vintage Of The Cases Concerning The "Limited Duty
Rule," It Is A Relic Of A Simpler Time Predating Modem Stadiums And Areas
Defendants quote from a variety of opinions which apparently tum upon sentimental
13 Mr. Anderson's affidavit does not address the differences between Open Bleacher Seating and MultiPurpose Areas and does not demonstrate that Mr. Anderson has made a study of any statistics regarding
any alleged "industry standards"; does not demonstrate that Mr. Anderson has reviewed any literature
documenting that any body has ever been convened to set "industry standards"; does not demonstrate
that Mr. Anderson has determined the number of minor league stadiums in the country and attempted to
determine what percentage of those limit the extent of netting to any particular portion of the field; does
not demonstrate that any "industry standard" (if such exists), applies to Multi-Purpose Areas specifically
designed for consuming food and beverage and socializing around movable circular tables and chairs,
where it is anticipated that at least some of the occupants of those areas will be facing away from the ball
field ("table and chair/food and drink areas"); and does not demonstrate that Mr. Anderson has any
knowledge whatsoever as to what "industry standards" may be applicable to "table and chair/food and
drink areas."

Mr. Anderson's claim to expertise is based on his experience of 43 years experience in the "netting
industry" as a seller and installer of netting to "entities in the United States and Canada" (Anderson Aff. at
~2); his company has installed barrier netting at seven baseball stadiums in Washington and surrounding
states (Anderson Aff. at ~3); his company has installed netting at Memorial Stadium in Boise, Idaho and
six other baseball stadiums all in Washington, one of which was apparently a softball stadium, and an
unspecified number of high schools in Idaho and Washington (Anderson Aff. at ~4); he has installed
barrier netting at an unspecified number of baseball stadiums in Illinois, Wisconsin and Arizona
(Anderson Aff. at ~8); he has traveled to and had the chance to observe barrier netting at many other
baseball stadiums "throughout the United States" (Anderson Aff. at ~8); he had in his possession at the
time of the execution of his affidavit photographs of seven stadiums (most of which either do not depict all
areas of stadium seating or are insufficient to allow the viewer to determine where netting is placed (see
photo marked "Wrigley Field" in which it appears that Mr. Anderson has marked "end of netting" before
the netting actually ends) (Anderson Aff. at ~11).
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notions that no one should ever be deprived of the pleasure of catching a foul ball, and that but
for that opportunity our national pastime (it was once) would dissolve like the wicked witch of
the west in a rain storm. By this logic, the Boise Hawks must be almost out of business, since it
is undisputed that 1) virtually all of the Open-Bleacher Seating is protected by vertical and at
least some overhead netting, 2) the Hawks Nest is fully protected by vertical and overhead
netting, 3) the small area of the Hawks Nest known as the Executive Suite is fully protected by
overhead netting, and 4) the area ofthe Executive Suite in which Mr. Rountree lost his eye is the
only area in the park not protected by vertically strung netting.
Defendants point to one sage who apparently took judicial notice of the fact that
spectators "demand" to be allowed to catch foul balls. This observation is illustrative of the
sentimentality in which the "Limited Duty Rule" is soaked. The fact that fans catch foul balls
does not even remotely constitute proof that they demand to do so, or that it is reasonable to
accede to such a demand even if the mere fact that fans catch balls is interpreted to be a demand.
The fact that people drive drunk on highways neither implies that they demand to do so, or that it
is reasonable to subordinate considerations of safety to accommodate them. It elevates the
potential loss of an eye or the death of a child above the "joy" of catching a foul ball.

It

assumes that people would give up attending games because they are deprived of the extremely
remote possibility of catching a foul ball given the numbers attending games. In short, the

"Limited Duty Rule" has not been adopted in Idaho, should not be adopted in Idaho, and there is
no basis for concluding as a matter of law that the Boise Hawks had no duty to guard against the
injury Mr. Rountree suffered or to warn him that it was not safe to take his eyes off the ball game
in the Executive Club area despite the fact that it was set up to allow people to sit and stand
around circular tables where they would be foreseeably distracted from the game, or that the
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Boise Hawks did not voluntarily assume the duty to make the dining areas within the park,
including the Executive Club safe for their patrons.

3. Mr. Rountree Did Not Consent To The Risk That Brought About His Injury Or
Impliedly Assume The Risk That The Mixed-Use Boise HawkslExecutive Club Area
Was Negligently Designed And Maintained
As Defendants note in their briefing, the doctrine of "primary implied assumption of risk" is
"an alternative expression for the proposition that defendant was not negligent, that is, there was
no duty owed or there was no breach of an existing duty." App. Brief at 37. Defendants premise
this argument on a strained reading of Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500,777 P.2d 722 (1989):
The Court in Winn, however, was ofthe opinion that primary implied assumption of risk is
still a viable defense in Idaho, and found that the facts in Salinas were not appropriate to
overrule implied assumption of risk in the primary sense. Specifically, the Winn Court said
that the facts in Salinas were only appropriate for the application of implied assumption of
risk in the secondary sense and therefore any implied rejection of implied assumption of risk
in the primary sense by the Salinas Court was dicta. See Winn, 116 Idaho at 503, 777 P.2d at
725.

App. Brief at 39. This reasoning is a non-sequetor, in that this Court did not declare Winn's
implied rejection of implied assumption of risk in the primary sense dicta because the facts in

Salinas were only appropriate for the application of implied assumption of risk in the secondary
sense. Rather, this Court has wisely held "We do not, therefore, feel bound not to consider
whether Salinas declared assumption of the risk in the "primary sense" no longer viable.
Nevertheless, we decline to premise our decision here upon such a nebulous and confounded
concept." Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 503, 777 P.2d 722, 725 (1989).
Irrespective of the fact that Salinas discussion of the doctrine of primary assumption of
the risk was dicta, it is the holdings in Salinas that are not dicta that control this case:
Furthermore, the "all-or-nothing" effect of application of the assumption of risk defense
is inequitable. It runs counter to all sense of reason and fairness. This is particularly true
in today's age of comparative negligence; it would be the ultimate legal inconsistency to
reject contributory negligence as an absolute defense yet at the same time allow its effect
to continue under the guise of assumption of risk. The scope of 1. C. § 6-801 is broad. It is
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not limited to certain types of action; it is not limited by exceptions. Rather, it covers any
action in which the plaintiff is seeking to recover on grounds of negligence. Section 680 l's intent is clear: Contributory negligence is not to be a complete bar to recovery;
instead, liability is to be apportioned between the parties based on the degree of fault for
which each is responsible.
Furthermore, to avoid the confusion created by this doctrine, we hold that the use of
assumption of risk as a defense shall have no legal effect in this state. The types of issues
raised by a plaintiffs non-express assumption of risk are readily handled by resort to
contributory negligence principles. Thus, such issues should be discussed in terms of
contributory negligence, not assumption of risk, and applied accordingly under our
comparative negligence laws.
The one exception to our holding today involves a situation where a plaintiff, either in
writing or orally, expressly assumes the risk involved. In such a case, the plaintiffs
assumption of the risk will continue to be a complete bar to recovery. Again, in order to
avoid misunderstanding and confusion, the terminology of assumption of risk, however,
should not be used. Rather, since express assumption of risk clearly sounds in contract
and not tort, see Eman, supra, "Deafening Silence," at 680, the correct terminology to use
to assert this defense should be that of "consent" or something of a similar nature.
With one important exception, we acknowledge the validity of a contractual assumption
of risk operating as a total bar to recovery. The exception is the general contract rule that
contracts which violate public policy are not recognized.
Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 989-90, 695 P.2d 369, 374-75 (1985) Emphasis supplied,
footnotes omitted. 1\15 Because Defendants cannot prove a contractual assumption of the risk or

14 Though the Court in Salinas initially preserves the doctrine of assumption of the risk ''where a plaintiff,
either in writing or orally, expressly assumes the risk involved" under a "contractual assumption of risk
operating as a total bar to recovery," one doubts whether even an express general release of liability
would apply in a situation where patrons are lured into what appears to be an area furnished with
protective netting and circular tables where patrons are invited to divert their attention from the game.
Here there is no valid argument that there was even a general contractual assumption of the risk.
15 Complying with Salinas' admonition regarding nomenclature, Defendants began their argument below
on the issue of "consent" by accurately noting that Salinas requires the "express" assumption of the risk.
Defendants have not appealed the District Court's denial of their motion for summary judgment based on
consent. Defendants argued below: "The risk assumed has been defined a number of ways, but in its
most basic sense it means that the plaintiff, in advance, has given his consent to relieve the defendant of
an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what
the defendant is to do or leave undone. ... If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly
obvious, plaintiff has consented to them ... The result is that the defendant is relieved of legal duty to the
plaintiff; and being under no duty, he cannot be charged with negligence." CR 587-589. Below,
Defendants contended that the cases they site stand for the proposition that simply entering a ball park
manifests a contractual consent to assume all unspecified risks of injury while within the ball park.
Plainly, if such were the case, there is no distinction between the tort doctrine of "assumption of the risk"
and a judicially created virtually irrebutable presumption that entering into a ball park carries with it an
implied agreement that the patron "assumes all risk." That could hardly have been what this Court
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consent, on appeal they have simply collapsed "assumption of risk" and "consent" into Primary
Assumption Of The Risk. Little wonder that this Court wisely regards Primary Assumption Of
The Risk to be a "nebulous and confounded concept."
Defendants site many cases in favor of applying the "Limited Duty Rule" and "Primary
Assumption Of The Risk" to the Hawks Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose Area. Consistent
with the clear language of Idaho Code § 6-801 "contributory negligence or comparative
responsibility shall not bar recovery" and this Court's decision in Salinas declining to develop
judicial exceptions to that prohibition, the Indiana Supreme Court held that these doctrines were
inconsistent with comparative negligence:
Under Indiana's Comparative Fault Act, a plaintiffs recovery will be diminished or
precluded depending upon the degree of the plaintiffs own fault. See Ind.Code §§ 34-512-5, -6. Such fault includes "any act or omission that is negligent, willful, wanton,
reckless, or intentional toward the person or property of others. The term also includes
unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, incurred
risk, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages." Ind.Code § 346-2-45(b). For all relevant purposes in today's discussion, the terms "incurred risk" and
"assumption of risk" are equivalent. Heck v. Robey, 659 N.E.2d 498, 504 n. 6 (Ind. 1995)
(treating the two alike but noting prior decisions applying" 'assumption of risk' in
contract cases, and 'incurred risk' in non-contract cases"). The concept of incurred risk
(and its analogue, assumption of risk) is centered on a plaintiffs "mental state of
venturousness" and "demands a subjective analysis of actual knowledge." Smith v.
Baxter, 796 N.E.2d 242,244 (Ind.2003) (internal citation omitted); see also Clark v.
Wiegand, 617 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Ind. 1993). Incurred risk, even when characterized as
objectively-assessed primary assumption of risk, cannot be a basis to find the absence of
duty on the part of the alleged tortfeasor.
We reject this primary assumption-of-risk terminology to the extent that it
suggests that a lack of duty may stem from a plaintiffs incurred risk. Under the
[Comparative Fault] Act, a plaintiff may relieve a defendant of what would
otherwise be his or her duty to the plaintiff only by an express consent.
Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 505.
Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392,399-400 (Ind. 2011). Rather, after reviewing cases
around the country adopting Primary Assumption-0l-Risk, the Indiana Supreme Court explained
contemplated in Salinas, else there would have been no purpose behind abrogating the tort doctrine of
"assumption of the risk."
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how the duty analysis always employed by Courts was sufficient to address any concerns that no
duty was owed in the context of sporting events under specific circumstances:
We conclude that sound judicial policy can be achieved within the framework of existing
Indiana statutory law and jurisprudence. As noted previously, there are three principal
elements in a claim for negligence: duty, breach of duty, and a proximately caused injury.
When there is no genuine issue of material fact and anyone of these elements is clearly
absent, summary judgment is appropriate. Colen v. Pride Vending Serv., 654 N.E.2d
1159, 1162 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied But rather than focusing upon the inherent
risks of a sport as a basis for finding no duty, which violates Indiana statutory and
decisional law, the same policy objectives can be achieved without inconsistency with
statutory and case law by looking to the element of breach of duty, which is determined
by the reasonableness under the circumstances of the actions of the alleged tortfeasor.
Breach of duty usually involves an evaluation of reasonableness and thus is usually a
question to be determined by the finder of fact in negligence cases. Kroger Co. v.
Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1,9 (Ind.2010); Sharp, 790 N.E.2d at 466. But in cases involving
sports injuries, and in such cases only, we conclude that a limited new rule should apply
acknowledging that reasonableness may be found by the court as a matter oflaw. As
noted above, the sports participant engages in physical activity that is often inexact and
imprecise and done in close proximity to others, thus creating an enhanced possibility of
injury to others. The general nature of the conduct reasonable and appropriate for a
participant in a particular sporting activity is usually commonly understood and subject to
ascertainment as a matter of law. This approach is akin to that taken by the Arizona
courts in Estes when faced with the Arizona Constitution's explicit declaration that
assumption of risk is a question of fact that shall be left to the jury.2 188 Ariz. at 96,932
P.2d at 1367.
Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 403-04 (Ind. 2011). Footnotes omitted. Indeed, one of
the cases that Defendants cite in urging this Court to adopt the concept of Primary Assumption
Of The Risk recognizes that it is simply another way of stating that
"Traditionally, the participant's conduct was conveniently analyzed in terms ofthe
defensive doctrine of assumption of risk. With the enactment of the comparative
negligence statute, however, assumption of risk is no longer an absolute defense. Thus, it
has become necessary, and quite proper, when measuring a defendant's duty to a plaintiff
to consider the risks assumed by the plaintiff. The shift in analysis is proper because the
"doctrine [of assumption of risk] deserves no separate existence (except for express
assumption of risk) and is simply a confusing way of stating certain no-duty rules."
Turcotte Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432,437-38,502 N.E.2d 964,967,510 N.Y.S.2d 49,52-53
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1986). Thus, Turcotte, if extended to spectators, makes the case that the doctrine
of "assumption of risk" is unnecessary, because there is no need for the doctrine where there is
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no duty of due care. Such an analysis in this case makes sense. Employing this analysis is more
equitable than simply adopting the "Limited Duty Rule" or the Primary Assumption a/The Risk.
While it may be reasonable to simply conclude that there is no duty to provide protective netting
in Open-Bleacher Seating, even the "Limited Duty Rule" recognizes that there are areas directly
behind home plate where doing so is not reasonable. What the "Limited Duty Rule," initially
formulated before the advent of modem stadiums with Multi-Purpose Areas does not
contemplate, is that the similar considerations to those that require protective screening behind
home plate, may apply to other areas of the stadium. Much as a one-size fits all approach may
appeal to Defendants, it does not provide either the flexibility or the deterrent to negligence in
situations outside Open-Bleacher Seating that the present required analysis under Turpen
provides. Idaho's presently enunciated flexible standard is more in keeping with general
principles of negligence law:
It has been long held that an owner of a theatre or other public assembly has a duty to
guard against risks which should be anticipated or averted by the exercise of ordinary
care .... "Patrons are entitled to protection against acts which by their nature might cause
a menace to safety. One who collects a large number of people for gain or profit must be
vigilant to protect them." Id. "Whenever the one in possession or control of property, for
his gain or profit, invites or permits the public without discrimination to disport
themselves upon it, the duty of exercising care requires him 'to provide an adequate
degree of general supervision. '"
Wilson v. Leisure Time Recreation, Inc., 192 Misc. 2d 553,557, 746 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824-25 (Civ.

Ct. 2002). Citations omitted. Emphasis supplied.
It is unnecessary to address the issue of whether the risk involved was simply that of
being hit by a foul ball, or the risk that the protective measures taken by the Boise Hawks in the
were inadequate and led Plaintiff to abandon what attempts he would have made to protect
himself from the risk of foul balls because Mr. Rountree was lulled into a false sense that the
Boise Hawks had taken adequate measures to protect him from that hazard. See, Rountree Aff.
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~~16,

19-20, Gill Aff. ,-r,-r59-69. See, discussion of facts at p. 6 and human factors experts analysis

at p. 13 above. Here again, one of the cases cited by Defendants implicitly refutes the
appropriateness of declining to extend the doctrine of Primary Assumption O/The Risk under
the facts of this case. In Hunt v. Portland Baseball Club the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
"We are brought to the conclusion that plaintiff by his own act of knowingly placing himself in
an area of appreciated risk, which was not created by any unreasonable conduct of the defendant,

bars him from recovery for his injuries." Hunt v. Portland Baseball Club, 207 Or. 337, 354, 296
P.2d 495, 502-03 (1956). Emphasis supplied. Hunt implicitly acknowledges the crucial factual
distinction between Open-Bleacher Seating and the Hawks Nest/Executive Club Multi-Purpose
Area; the risk must be appreciated. To answer that question, it is important to identify the risk or
risks that caused to Plaintiff to lose his eye. Mr. Rountree's deposition, affidavit, and the
affidavit of Human Factors Expert Joellen Gill all evidence the fact that Mr. Rountree did not
appreciate the risk involved because of the factors discussed above. Defendants also cited below
Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983) in support of their representation that "Other
comparative fault jurisdictions that have abrogated assumption of risk as a defense continue to
recognize consent as an absolute bar in an action for negligence." Kuehner also counsels against
adopting the doctrine of Primary Assumption o/The Risk:
"If the plaintiff is found not to have subjectively appreciated the risk, the trier of fact
must determine, after reviewing all evidence, whether this plaintiff should have
reasonably anticipated the risk involved. Brady v. Kane, 111 So.2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA
1959). If it is found that a reasonable man would not have anticipated this risk, the
"unsuspecting plaintiff' cannot be said to have consented to such danger and he therefore
should be allowed to recover in full.
Kuehner, 80.
Defendants cite Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) in support of their "implied consent" argument. Unlike Idaho,
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California does not require an express consent to assume any risk, and it continues to follow the
tort doctrine of "assumption of risk." "In the instant case, plaintiff impliedly consented to take
her own chances that she would not be injured. She voluntarily elected to sit in a seat which was
clearly unprotected by any form of screening." Neinstein, 184,229. "On the other hand, where
the plaintiffs conduct amounts to a release of the defendant's obligation of reasonable conduct,
the assumption of risk doctrine continues to operate. Neinstein 183,615. Emphasis supplied.
Most significantly, in Neinstein "... plaintiff impliedly consented to take her own chances that she
would not be injured. She voluntarily elected to sit in a seat which was clearly unprotected by
any form of screening. Neinstein 184,616. Emphasis supplied. In contrast, the area that Mr.
Rountree was injured was not "clearly unprotected by any form of screening." It was protected
by a mesh barrier strung over the top of the Executive Club but not by vertically strung netting,
making it appear that the Boise Hawk's management had determined that while there might be a
danger to patrons from pop-fly foul balls, there was no danger from line-drive foul balls.
Finally, Defendants argue that this Court should adopt the doctrine of Primary

Assumption of The Risk because "The impracticability of applying the Salinas rule to spectator
events is apparent, as it would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the oral or written consent of
each spectator before a game." App. Briefat 41. However, the statutes to which they cite all contain
required warnings as a substitute for express consent. Defendants may resort to the legislature for
similar protection, if they can make a convincing case for protection as other sports industries have
done.

4. Home Plate Food Services, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment Was Based Solely
On A Single Inadmissible Legal Conclusion With No Facts In The Record To
Support It
Obviously, Mr. Rahr's bald assertion that Home Plate Food Services, Inc. did not
"operate, maintain, or control" any area of Memorial Stadium is no more than a legal conclusion.
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Mr. Rahr's affidavit is silent as to whether or not either Home Plate Food Services, Inc. and
Memorial Stadium had the right to "operate, maintain, or control" any area of Memorial Stadium, or
whether or not it may have exercised that right, and is silent as to whether or not Home Plate Food
Services, Inc. conducted any activities within Memorial Stadium. If the moving party fails to
challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact on that element, the burden does not shift to the non-moving party, and the nonmoving party is not required to respond with supporting evidence. Smith v. Meridian Joint

School District No.2, 918 P.2d 583,588 (Idaho, 1996). Statements that are conclusory or
speculative cannot satisfy either the requirement of the admissibility or competency under
I.R.C.P.56(e). Delaney v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 2002 Westlaw 433638
(Idaho, 2002).
It is reasonable to infer that Home Plate Food Services, Inc. has some control over the
screened in dining areas given that it 1) operates its concessions within the screened in Hawk's Nest,
2) that its patrons consume food and beverages purchased from it within that area and the Executive
Club, 3) that both areas are furnished with circular tables around which its patrons dine and
socialized, 4) that nothing in the record evidences any other entity performing these functions in
these areas, 5) and that its patrons dine and socialize in both areas, that it plays some role in
managing the location of the tables and had at a minimum a duty to warn patrons that one of the
vertical openings into those areas was unprotected and that patrons should not rely upon the fact that
they were implicitly invited to sit around circular tables with their backs to the game as indicating
anything about their safety in doing so.
Mr. Rahr's averments carry within them inferences undermining Defendants' motion for

summary judgment. Mr. Rahr further avers that "For those people who want to order food anellor
beverages after the game has started and while the game is being played, the Boise Hawks have a

- 42-

full service eating and drinking area called the "Hawks Nest," which is located adjacent to the
Executive Club (closer towards home plate) and is fully enclosed by barrier netting." CR 551,
Rahr Aff. ,-[10. These averments carry with them important inferences: the Boise Hawks
purportedly stop serving food and beverages in the Executive Club area because 1) they
recognize that eating, drinking and socializing around tables creates a distraction from the field
of play, 2) that unlike the other area (the Hawks Nest) that serves food and beverages where
patrons may rely on the fact that are fully protected from foul balls, the Boise Hawks have
consciously decided to take lesser measures to guard against the same hazard, and 3) that there
remains a risk of injury for those in that specific area who are distracted and not paying attention
to the game. At least with respect to the Hawks Nest, the Boise Hawks have voluntarily "fully
enclosed by barrier netting" an area furnished with circular tables, chairs and stools to protect
patrons occupying that area from the dangers of foul balls that they may not see because they are
distracted by conversation, the orientation of their seats, or otherwise. Mr. Rountree had
reserved a table at which to eat in the Hawks Nest, CR 601, Rountree Aff. ,-[5, he and his family
were served by a waitress in that dining area, and she apparently agreed to hold their table awaiting
their return from the Executive Club. CR 439, Rountree Depo. p. 58 1. 8 to p. 59 1. 5.
Mr. Rahr's assertion that after the beginning of baseball games the "Executive Club"
serves only as an alternate location from which games may be viewed without the obstruction of
netting is belied by the testimony of many witnesses. Contradicting that, Mr. Rountree states
that this area is furnished with circular tables around which patrons sit, eating, drinking and
conversing during the time that games are being played. Mr. Rountree avers that he witnessed
this occurring prior to and on the night of his accident. CR 602, Rountree Aff. ,-[,-[8-10. Mr.
Rountree's wife, Linda Ballard, testified to the same effect. CR 462, Ballard Depo. P. 3611. 916. A witness to the accident, Lisa Leek, testified that she was in the "Executive Club" talking
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with Ms. Ballard while the game was being played. CR 494, Leek Depo. p. 29 1. 9-13. She
testified that there were tables in that area, CR 496, Leek Depo. p. 40 1. 8-12, and that people
were congregating in various parts of the "Executive Club," not just up at the railing. CR 497,
Leek Depo. p. 42 1. 24 to p. 43 1. 7. Ms. Leek testified that her family ate all of the food that they
had brought to the game in the "Executive Club" area. CR 491, Leek Depo. p. 201. 12-21.
Finally, there is nothing in the record establishing the fact that Home Plate Food Services,
Inc. was not involved in designing and determining the barrier netting configuration in the area
within which it operated and within which its patrons sat to dine and socialize. Quite to the contrary,

Mr. Rahr states that he has no idea what entity was involved in that process. CR 550, Rahr AjJ. ~6.
CONCLUSION
Idaho has not adopted the "Limited Duty Rule" and there is no reason for it to do so. It
would undermine the policy considerations underlying the duty test adopted by Idaho long ago,
and reiterated in Turpen: "Every person, in the conduct of his business, has a duty to exercise
ordinary care to "prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." The factors
discussed in Turpen all point to a duty on the part of the Boise Hawks that was breached. The
harm suffered by Mr. Rountree was foreseeable; indeed the Defendants contend that it was
foreseeable to him and therefore had to have been foreseeable to them. It was virtually certain
that individuals hit by line-drive foul balls would suffer injury. There is a close connection
between the Defendants' conduct and the injury suffered, in that but for their failure to cover the
sole area in the park without protective vertical netting, Mr. Rountree would not have been
struck by the foul ball, and it is reasonable to assume that if he had been warned that it was
dangerous to sit and stand around tables and look away from the ball field, despite the fact that
was apparently the intended use of the Executive Club, he probably would have heeded such a
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warnmg. Preventing future harm under these circumstances is desirable as a matter of public
policy. Under the circumstances of this case, the extent ofthe burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach are trivial. Other facts involving other stadiums might yield other results, but we are
dealing with this case, and these unique facts. Finally, the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved are not an issue in this case. Plaintiff is of the understanding that
the Defendants are fully insured. (Citations omitted.)
There is no evidence that Mr. Rountree ever expressly consented to accept any risk
attendant to going to the baseball game, never mind the risk that the Boise Hawks would have
implemented a safety management program that was defectively designed and created a false
sense of safety leading him to divert his attention from the baseball game believing it was safe to
do so. Per force, there is no evidence that Mr. Rountree received any consideration for such an
express consent. Since there is no evidence of any express consent to accepting the risk in this
case, Plaintiff will not discuss the public policy exception discussed in Turpen unless the issue is
raised in oral argument. Most important, the "Limited Duty Rule" urged on the Court by
Defendants is rapidly either being abandoned or at least limited to Open-Bleacher Seating, as
opposed to the type of Multi-Purpose Area in which Mr. Rountree was injured, even in states
whose legislatures have enacted some version ofthe rule. Defendants' motion for summary
judgment must be denied.
Dated May 1 2012.

Will Breck Seiniger, Jr.
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